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Embedding a Field Experiment in Contingent Valuation to Measure Context-
Dependent Risk Preferences: Does Prospect Theory Explain Individual 
Responses for Wildfire Risk? 
 
Kimberly Rollins and Mimako Kobayashi 
 
Introduction 
When stated preference approaches are used to elicit willingness-to-pay in probabilistic contexts, 
modeling underlying individual risk preferences based on expected utility (EU) would lead to 
biased welfare estimates if in fact risk preferences are not consistent with expected utility (e.g. 
Jindapon  and  Shaw  2008,  Shaw  and  Woodward  2008,  Riddel  and  Shaw  2006).    EU-based 
welfare  measures  would  either  overstate  or  understate  predicted  net  social  net  benefits  of  a 
proposed  policy  depending  on  how  much  true  risk  preferences  deviate  from  linear  risk 
preferences and the direction and the magnitude of shifts in probabilities brought about by the 
policy.  Deviations from expected-utility theory have serious implications for the application of 
contingent valuation (CV) to a variety of contexts in which policy outcomes are probabilistic, 
such  as  policies  that  address  climate  change,  morbidity  and  mortality  from  exposure  to 
environmental toxins, and loss due to catastrophic events.  To date, however, few studies attempt 
to explicitly incorporate non-expected utility (non-EU) theory into CV methods.  This paper 
contributes towards the development of an approach that would generate welfare measures that 
accommodate non-EU risk preferences.  In particular, we combine the empirical approach from 
Harrison et al (2006) with CV methodologies.  Based on prospect theory, this approach allows us 
to estimate parameters of an indirect utility function and of a probability weighting function for a 2 
 
representative individual, an approach that accounts for individual characteristics as determinants 
of preferences over risk and utility. 
Research published in other literatures suggests that people who understand the probability of 
wildfire occurrence and the extent of their losses, should wildfire occur, nevertheless choose not 
to invest in wildfire preparedness (Nelson et al 2005, Cortner and Gale 1990, Schulte and Miller 
2010).  This is indicative of risk-seeking behavior among property owners facing wildfire risks, 
and the observation fits well with the prediction of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) where a convex utility curve is assumed in loss space.  This 
implies that the property owner prefers a “gamble” (i.e. betting on the chance that a wildfire will 
not occur or, should it occur, the damage will be small) to a “sure loss” in terms of expenditures 
on investments to mitigate wildfire risks. 
Moreover, for any one property owner, even in parts of the U.S. that are deemed to be at 
‘high risk’ of wildfire, the loss of a home from wildfire is a low-probability high-consequence 
event,  a  situation  in  which  the  conditions  of  EU  theory  are  potentially  violated  (Shaw  and 
Woodward 2008).  An unbiased measurement of individual willingness-to-pay for wildfire risk 
mitigation is necessary for public policies to encourage efficient levels of private investment.  
Therefore, in this paper, we model property-owners’ risk preferences regarding wildfire risks in a 
non-EU framework.  We apply prospect theory (Kahneman  and Tversky  1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992) because it fits well with the observation and also because it accommodates 
subjective, non-linear transformation of objective probabilities. 
An extensive literature in non-EU theory includes empirical work in which laboratory or 
field  experiments  are  typically  used  to  collect  data  to  measure  individual  risk  preferences 
(Harrison and Rustrom 2009, Shaw and Woodward 2008).  However, development of elicitation 3 
 
methods  that  are  consistent  with  non-EU  theory  and  CV  formats  appears  to  lag  behind.  
Elicitation methods used in the experimental literature are generally context-free and based on 
lotteries with monetary gains and losses.  On the other hand, CV formats require that the contexts 
in which the respondents rate the policy in question to be explicitly defined in the elicitation 
material.    In  comparing  across  laboratory  experiments  and  survey-based  WTP  elicitation 
methods, several authors report that measures of risk preferences are not stable across elicitation 
methods  (Hey,  Morone  and  Schmidt  2009)  and,  further,  not  stable  across  types  of  gambles 
(Anderson and Mellor 2009).  In the prospect-theory framework, as Wakker (1994) point out, the 
utility  for  a  good  is  independent  of  risk  preferences,  while  individual  preferences  over 
probabilities  are  context-dependent.    Thus  it  is  not  correct  to  assume  that  context-free  risk 
preference parameters can be applied to a specific context, as in Nguyen and Leung (2009). 
Because risk preferences have been shown to be context dependent, that future CV survey’s 
should included context-dependent measures of risk preferences.  
To combine the merits of the two elicitation approaches, in our application, we use a 
survey  with  willingness-to-pay  elicitation  questions  written  in  a  lottery-like  format,  where  a 
hypothetical situation is described to closely resemble the actual policy context. Consequently, 
the use of covariates becomes important in determining what individual characteristics explain 
deviations from population risk preferences.  In a valuation context, risk preferences typically 
vary  substantially  across  individuals  and  their  determinants  are  of  interest  to  policy  makers, 
especially where programs may be developed to target specific groups.  Leiter and Pruckner 
(2009), for example, find that willingness to pay for a program that would reduce the risk of 
being  killed  in  an  avalanche  is  sensitive  to  the  level  of  avalanche  probability  only  when 
individual characteristics are controlled for.  In our application, we allow the parameters of the 4 
 
indirect utility function and the probability weighting function to vary across individuals, as is 
done by Nguyen and Leung (2009) and Harrison (2006).  We further claim that, because we are 
interested  in  context-dependent  risk  preferences,  additional  econometric  modification  is 
necessary to account for the differences in how the context is perceived by different individuals.  
Therefore, in our application, we include “utility shifters” or additive terms in the indirect utility 
function  that  vary  with  individual  characteristics.    While  inclusion  of  additive  terms  in  an 
indirect utility function is a standard procedure in the valuation studies (Haab and McConnell 
2002), we are not aware of a study where utility shifters are included even when risk parameters 
are  allowed  to  vary  across  individuals.    We  apply  the  proposed  elicitation  and  estimation 
approaches to estimate the risk preferences of homeowners that face probabilistic wildfire risks 
and an investment option that reduces losses due to wildfire. 
 
Probabilistic wildfire risks and willingness to pay to reduce losses 
The severity and size of wildfires on public lands in the United States have increased steadily 
over the past decades, with a corresponding increase in wildfire suppression costs (Stephens and 
Ruth 2005, Calkin et al 2005, Gebert et al 2005, Gebert et al 2007, Westerling et al. 2006, GAO 
2004, GAO 2007).  Prior decades of over-suppression of wildfires have contributed to this trend: 
the amount of fuels is greater than what would have otherwise accumulated so that wildfires that 
ultimately burn are larger, hotter and more difficult to control.  An average of 1,642,000 ha of 
federal and state managed public lands in the  US burned annually between 1960  and 2003; 
however by the last 5 years of this period, 2,271,000 ha burned annually (Stephens and Ruth 
2005).    The  U.S.  Forest  Service  and  Bureau  of  Land  Management  exceeded  their  wildfire 
suppression  budgets  every  year  for  the  14  years  leading  up  to  2003  (GAO  2004),  with 
expenditures surpassing a billion dollars per year in four out of the seven years leading up to 5 
 
2006 (Gebert et al 2008).  To the extent that these expenditures have increased faster than overall 
agency budgets, they crowd out land management activities that include pre-fire fuel reduction, a 
situation that further escalates wildfire suppression costs. 
Another  factor  contributing  to  the  escalation  of  wildfire  suppression  costs  is  residential 
development bordering public wildlands, along with a federal mandate that requires firefighting 
strategies to prioritize protection of private property second only to human safety (Calkin et al. 
2005).    Wildfire  suppression  strategies  on  lands  adjacent  to  residential  areas  are  complex, 
involve higher levels of risk to human safety and therefore are more expensive than fighting 
wildfires  on  open  lands.    However,  private  property-owners’  investments  in  fire-retarding 
landscaping  and  structural  retrofits  can  check  the  speed  and  extent  of  wildfire  spread  and 
improve the effectiveness of firefighting efforts.  These investments benefit the property owners, 
neighboring  property  owners  through  spillover  effects,  and  society  through  reduced  wildfire 
suppression  costs  (Shafran  2008,  Lankoande  and  Yoder  2006,  Butry  and  Donovan  2008).  
Lankokande and Yoder (2006) estimated a rate of return for wildfire suppression expenditures of 
112% and a rate of return for pre-fire preparedness expenditures of 376%.  Lankokande and 
Yoder conclude based on their analysis that additional funds used for pre-fire preparedness could 
lower  the  overall  cost  of  wildfire  to  society.    Accordingly,  public  programs  including  the 
Firewise Communities Program supported by multiple federal agencies, California’s Fire Safe 
Councils, and Nevada’s Living with Fire have been established to increase the level of private 
investment by providing informational, technical and financial support to property owners. 
A common observation, however, is that private property owners tend to invest less than 
what would appear to be in their own best interest in fire-safe actions (Brenkert-Smith, Champ, 
and  Flores  2006;  Winter  and  Fried  2000;  Winter,  Vogt,  and  Fried  2002).    Several  potential 6 
 
reasons have been suggested.  First, wildfire suppression costs accrue to public agencies and 
reduction of these costs is not likely internalized by private homeowners, thus resulting in private 
underinvestment relative to socially optimum levels.  In addition, Kobayashi, Rollins, and Taylor 
(2010) show that ranchers using public rangelands underinvest in effort to reduce wildfire risk, 
which increases the threat of wildfire affecting residences on nearby lands.  Second, in addition 
to  the  cost  externality,  physical  externalities  or  spillover  effects  of  fire-safe  actions  on  one 
property to neighboring properties can result in a suboptimal community-level fire-safe outcome 
(Butry and Donovan 2008; Shafran 2008).  Third, occurrence, spread, and severity of wildfire are 
probabilistic,  and  risk  preferences  of  individual  property  owners  can  affect  their  fire-safe 
investment  decisions.    This  paper  specifically  investigates  individual  risk  preferences  using 
information  about  property-owners’  stated  willingness  to  invest  in  improvements  to  reduce 
property losses in the event of a wildfire.   
 
Modeling Approach 
We start by considering the options available to a homeowner who faces a known probability p 
of wildfire affecting her property within the year.  In the event of a wildfire, she will bear known 
loss ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 0￿.  If no action is taken to mitigate the loss, she incurs no cost when there is no 
fire.  She has the option of paying ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿ for fire preparedness that would, in the case of fire, 
reduce her loss to ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 0￿.  In the case of no fire, with the probability of 1-p, the loss 
to the homeowner is c, the cost of the investment.  The homeowner has two options:  (1) do not 
to invest and bear no loss as long as a fire does not occur, and bear loss d0 should fire occur, or 
(2) invest and bear “sure” loss of c in both states of nature with an additional loss of d1 should 
fire occur.  Using the terminology of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) the two prospects (with and 7 
 
without investment) considered here are negative prospects, i.e. both outcomes of the two events 
(fire and no fire) are non-positive.  
Risk attitudes are jointly determined by the utility function ￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿ 0, and a probability 
weighting  function  ￿￿￿￿ w,  which  accommodates  nonlinear  preferences  in  probabilities.  
Following Kahneman and Tversky (1979), the prospective utility for each of the two cases is 
constructed as: 
(1)  ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿0￿￿    (no investment) 
(2)  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  (with investment) 
in which ￿￿￿￿ serves as a decision weight placed on the outcome with the larger loss, ￿￿ in (1) 
and ￿ ￿ ￿￿ in  (2).    A  higher  weight  indicates  greater  aversion  to  probabilistic  risk  for  a 
sufficiently small probability (Wakker 1994).  A psychological interpretation of the prospective 
utility formulation is that, for prospect (2), the “gamble” offers a sure disutility of ￿￿￿￿, with a 
chance ￿￿￿￿ to incur an additional disutility of ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ (Gonzalez and Wu 1999).
1   
 
Form of the probability weighting function ￿￿￿￿  
Observed subjective transformation of objective probabilities is typically of an inverse-S shape 
(Kahneman  and  Tversky  (1979);  Gonzalez  and  Wu  1999),  and  such  a  curve  is  commonly 
specified  in  estimating  probability  weighting  function ￿￿￿￿.    The  shape  and  position  of  an 
inverse-S-shaped  ￿￿￿￿  also  have  corresponding  psychological  interpretations,  namely 
“sensitivity” and “attractiveness.”  They can be more easily explained with specific functional 
forms of ￿￿￿￿.  We consider two functional forms of ￿￿￿￿ that are adopted in the literature (e.g. 
                                                           
1 Prospect theory does not require ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) claim the condition of 
“subcertainty,” ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1, is “an essential element of people’s attitudes to uncertain events” and more 
consistent with actual observations. 
 8 
 
Tversky  and  Kahneman  1992;  Gonzalez  and  Wu  1999;  Etchart-Vincent  2004)  in  specifying 
equations (1) and (2): 






(4)  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿. 
As  illustrated  in  Figure  1,  both  functions  are  inverse-S  shaped  provided  0<γ<1  and  thus 
account  for  the  observation  of  overweighting  ￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿  of  small  probabilities  and 
underweighting ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ of  large  probabilities. ￿￿￿￿￿,  however,  is  less  restrictive  than 
￿￿￿￿￿:  parameter γ in ￿￿￿￿￿ regulates both the curvature and the position (or elevation) of the 
probability weighting function, while in ￿￿￿￿￿ parameter γ regulates the curvature and δ the 
position of the function.  Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the shape of each function for different 
values of parameters γ and δ. 
Curvature  represents  the  psychological  principle  of  “diminishing  sensitivity,”  where  the 
impact of a loss diminishes with distance from the reference point, at either probability 0% or at 
100% in this case (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).  In Figures 1 through 3, this is seen in that the 
curves are steeper for smaller and larger probabilities and flatter for mid-range probabilities.  
Figure 2 illustrates how diminishing sensitivity changes with the value of γ in ￿￿￿￿￿.  Relative to 
linear preferences over probability (the 45 degree line) lower values for γ cause the weighting 
function to be more horizontal, so that it crosses linear preferences at lower probabilities and 
represents  greater  overall  deviation  from  linear  preferences.  This  implies  that  changes  in 
probabilities  are  more  heavily  weighted  close  to  the  reference  points  and  are  less  heavily 
weighted elsewhere (Gonzalez and Wu 1999).  On the other hand, higher values of γ bring the 
curve closer to linear probability preferences characteristic of expected utility theory. 9 
 
The position of the probability weighting curve, that is, the absolute level of ￿￿￿￿,describes 
the “attractiveness” of the gamble.
 2  A higher decision weight ￿￿￿￿ implies that the gamble is 
considered to be more attractive for a positive prospect.  In the case of a negative prospect, the 
interpretation  is  reversed:  a  lower ￿￿￿￿ implies  a  more  attractive  gamble.    Figures  2  and  3 
graphically illustrate the relationship between the position of the ￿￿￿￿ curves and the valuation 
of objective probability.  For a fixed level of γ, curves that are positioned higher have wider 
ranges  of  probability  that  are  overweighed  (￿￿￿￿   ￿)  than  those  positioned  lower.    For  a 
negative prospect this can be interpreted as a higher ￿￿￿￿ curve being associated with higher 
probabilistic risk aversion, all else equal.  In ￿￿￿￿￿ a higher value of γ “elevates” the curve.  In 
￿￿￿￿￿, however, the position of the curve is regulated separately by parameter δ and, for a given 
level of γ, a higher value of δ elevates the curve.  Thus, there is a clear difference between 
equations (3) and (4) in terms of flexibility in treating the two psychological concepts (sensitivity 
and attractiveness).  Note that γ =1 and δ =1 reduce each curve to a straight line. 
Covariates used in empirical applications to estimate γ and δ control for individual differences in 
risk attitudes.  For example, a tendency toward linear preferences over probabilities may be 
related to years of education, or previous experience.  However, these covariates are distinct 
from those used to control for how individual differences affect utility.  In experimental settings, 
individual differences in utility are essentially controlled for by elicitation of risk preferences 
using choices over lotteries with different probabilities of money gains and losses. 
Form of the utility function, ￿￿￿￿ 
While expected utility theory deals with utility over wealth, prospect theory focuses on utilities 
of gains and losses from some reference level of utility.  A common approach is to assume 
                                                           
2 The position of ￿￿￿￿ also gives rise to the possibility of “subcertainty” or ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1.  In ￿￿￿￿￿, 
0<γ<1 implies subcertainty.  In ￿￿￿￿￿, δ<1 implies subcertainty while δ>1 implies supercertainty or ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿   1. 10 
 
constant  relative  risk  aversion  (CRRA);  however,  observations  are  also  abundant  that  are 
inconsistent with CRRA (Holt and Laury 2002).  Accordingly, we consider two functional forms 
for utility function ￿￿￿￿.  The first assumes CRRA as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) and the second is the more flexible Expo-Power function (Saha 1993; Holt and Laury 
2002).  For the domain of losses (￿ ￿ 0￿, where x represents c, c+d1 and d0, depending on the 
choice and outcome, the two functions are given as: 
(5)  CRRA  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! 
(6)  Expo-Power  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿"#$￿#%￿&
' . 
Since  our  context  is  defined  for  the  domain  of  losses,  the  interpretations  of  these 
functional forms are modified.  For ( ￿ 1, both curves are convex, with positive first and second 
derivatives.  This implies that, just as marginal utility diminishes for a risk-averse individual in 
the gain domain, marginal disutility diminishes as losses increase in absolute terms.  Thus, a risk-
seeking attitude is assumed over losses, where the risk premium is negative.  In equation (6), for 
a given value of (, smaller ) increases the absolute value of ￿￿￿￿￿ (i.e. increase the disutility 
levels), as illustrated in Figure 4. 
Empirical model 
Our  empirical  question  is:  under  what  conditions  would  an  individual be  willing  to  pay  for 
wildfire  preparedness?  That  is,  under  what  conditions  does  investment  increase  prospective 
utility?   Our empirical models are developed based on the prospective utilities (1) and (2).  In an 
empirical  formulation  following  a  random  utility  approach,  the  researcher  would  consider 
equations (1) and (2) as a deterministic and observable component of utility that is separable 
from a non-observable component, which is treated as a random error (e.g. Haab and McConnell 
2002).  However, respondents may make errors in forming prospective utility, in comparing 11 
 
prospective utilities, and in making choices among options (Harrison 2006).  Since the observer 
cannot distinguish between sources of error, we assume additive error terms *￿ and *￿ to the 
prospective  utility  V0  and  V1,  respectively,  that  incorporate  both  respondent  error  and 
measurement  error.
3   For  a  symmetric  probability  distribution  of *,  where * ￿ *￿ ￿ *￿,  the 
probability of an individual willing to take the fire-preparedness option (i.e. the probability of a 
‘yes’ response to the option) is characterized as: 
(7)  +,-.￿/012/￿ ￿ +,-.￿￿ ￿ ￿ *￿   ￿￿ ￿ *￿￿ ￿ +,-.￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿. 
Equation (7) does not include an “intercept term” that varies with covariates, a typical 
assumption  of  risk  preferences  with  experimental  data.    Because  we  are  interested  in  how 
individual characteristics may be associated with utility or disutility from the fire-preparedness 
investment that is additional to disutility they receive from the financial losses, we consider 
alternative versions of the utility functions in equations (5) and (6), where “utility shifters” are 
included:   
(8)  345￿￿￿ ￿ 647 ￿ ￿5￿￿￿, j=0,1, k=a,b, 
where ￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿￿ are  defined  in  equations  (5)  and  (6), 7 is  a  vector  of  individual 
characteristics,  and 6￿ and 6￿ are  the  marginal  effects  of  individual  characteristics  with  and 
without wildfire preparedness investment, respectively.  This specification results in prospective 
utilities ￿ 8￿ ￿ 6￿7 ￿ ￿￿ and ￿ 8￿ ￿ 6￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿, where ￿￿ and ￿ ￿ are defined in equations (1) and (2).  
The probability of a ‘yes’ response in equation (7) is accordingly modified: 
                                                           
3 Methods to address errors are suggested (Fechner 1966; Luce 1959) and commonly adopted (e.g. Bruner 2009).  
However, estimates of utility function parameters can be sensitive to the specification choice of error structures 
(Wilcox 2008, 2009; as cited in Harrison 2006).  The sensitivity was confirmed with our dataset, and thus we do not 
attempt to explicitly address this type of error in this study. 12 
 
(9)  +,-.￿/012/￿ ￿ +,-.9￿ 8￿ ￿ *̃￿   ￿ 8￿ ￿ *̃￿; ￿ +,-.￿*̃ ￿ 67 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, 
for  a  symmetric  probability  distribution  of *̃ ,  where  *̃ ￿ *̃￿ ￿ *̃￿  and  6 ￿ 6￿ ￿ 6￿ .    The 
coefficient vector 6 thus captures the change in the marginal effects of utility shifters  7 with and 
without making fire-preparedness investment.  The rationale for including Z in the model is that 
individuals may receive more or less satisfaction from investing in wildfire preparedness beyond 
the utilities from reduced monetary losses depending on their individual characteristics.  For 
example, individual choices would be expected to be influenced by personal experience with 
wildfire, familiarity and preferences for with wildfire preparedness options, and susceptibility to 
regret that an individual would feel if the decision turns out to be a wrong one (Weber 2010).  
Non-monetary aspects of creating defensible space include loss of aesthetic values and the time-
cost of maintaining the space.  These costs are likely to vary  with individual characteristics 
included in Z.  
  +￿/012/￿ is  estimated  closely  following  the  procedures  described  in  Harrison  (2006).  
Maximum likelihood estimation is used with an assumption of normally distributed *, and with 
error  correction  for  multiple  (three)  observations  for  each  respondent.    All  combinations  of 
￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿, and ￿￿￿￿￿ are used to construct ￿￿ and ￿ ￿, resulting in four estimation 
models.   
Data and Estimation Procedures 
Owners of homes in the 20 communities previously rated as being at highest risk of wildfire in 
Nevada (Resource Concepts, Inc. 2005) were surveyed in 2006.  The communities are located 
adjacent  to  public  lands  that  include  high  desert  rangelands  throughout  the  state  and  higher 
altitude forests near Lake Tahoe.  The majority of survey questions asked about the respondent’s 
residence and wildfire preparedness actions, including whether each item on a fairly complete 13 
 
list of actions had been already taken and if not, whether they would be taken by the homeowner, 
whether they considered wildfire preparedness to be effective, what prevented the respondent 
from  taking  actions,  perceived  risk  of  wildfire  in  the  location  of  their  residence,  previous 
experience with wildfire and a number of other attitudinal and demographic questions.  The 
survey resulted in an overall response rate of 19.6%.  A total of 1,149 observations from 383 
respondents are used in the analyses.  Respondents represent a variety of income ranges and a 
wide variation in other social and demographic characteristics.  Table 1 defines and summarizes 
variables used in this study.   
Risk preferences are elicited through several versions of three questions per respondent (one 
questionnaire version is included in appendix A) regarding respondents’ willingness to adopt 
hypothetical wildfire preparedness investment plans at given costs.  Each respondent is presented 
with a hypothetical probability of wildfire (p)  affecting their home during the 2006 wildfire 
season (approximately June through September), a specified dollar loss in the event of a wildfire 
if nothing is invested in wildfire preparedness (d0), and a dollar loss if the investment is made (d1 
such  that  d0  <  d1  ≤  0).    Respondents  were  asked  whether  they  would  invest  in  wildfire 
preparedness at three levels of cost (c1, c2, c3), using a 7-point response scale (‘Yes!!!’ ‘Yes!” 
‘Yes’ ‘Maybe’ ‘No’ ‘No!’ ‘No!!!’).  For this application, we treat ‘Yes!!!’ ‘Yes!” and ‘Yes’ 
responses as ‘yes’ and all other responses as ‘no.’  The only parameter that changes within an 
individual respondent’s questionnaire is the cost of wildfire preparedness (c1, c2, c3); variation in 
probability of fire and losses with and without wildfire preparedness occurs across the sample.  
The  data  are  used  to  estimate  a  representative  individual’s  willingness  to  pay  for  wildfire 
preparedness.  Variation in risk preferences and other individual characteristics are incorporated 
through the use of covariates.  Each respondent is presented with one of five values for p (1%, 14 
 
5%, 10%, 20%, and 60%); one of three values of losses d0 from fire if no investment ($50,000, 
$100,000, $200,000); and one of five levels of losses if fire d1 with investment in preparedness 
($0,  $10,000,  $20,000,  $50,000,  $100,000).    The  first  of  the  three  costs  c1  for  wildfire 
preparedness  proposed  to  each  respondent  is  one  of  five  values  ($2,000,  $10,000,  $20,000, 
$30,000, $40,000).  Two subsequent questions are repeated with alternate payments of ¼ and ½ 
of initial payment c1 for c2 and c3, respectively. 
The survey design is such that for all questionnaire versions the expected losses are smaller if 
wildfire  preparedness  actions  are  taken,  i.e.  ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ .    Thus,  if  all 
respondents were risk neutral, there should be no ‘no’ response to the offer.  The data show 
otherwise: as many as 54% of the observations are indeed ‘no’ responses, indicating risk-seeking 
attitude among the homeowners.  Further inspection of the data suggests possible inconsistency 
with expected utility theory.  The correlation coefficient between the risk-averse choice (‘yes’ to 
a  fire-preparedness  investment  option)  and  the  specified  wildfire  probability  is  negative  (-
0.1471).  On the other hand, the correlation coefficient between the risk-averse choice and the 
cost of damage without action (￿￿) ranged between -0.2405 and 0.0658 depending on specified 
fire probabilities.  These correlation coefficients alone do not suggest the data’s consistency or 
inconsistency with CRRA, possibly due to other “lottery” parameters that are not controlled for 
in the calculation of correlation coefficients. 
Estimation Results 
Table 2 summarizes the maximum likelihood results to estimate ), β, < and δ from Equation (7), 
the  specification  without  covariates,  for  the  four  models.    The  model  with ￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿￿ 
results in unrealistically large ( =.  For the other three models, the hypothesis of all coefficients 
simultaneously being zero is rejected, and each estimated coefficient is statistically significant.  15 
 
Estimated β values range between 0.312 and 0.479, confirming convex utility curves, implying 
that marginal disutility from loss is declining with increasing loss. 
4. In the probability weighing 
functions, 0 ￿ < > ￿ 1 is consistent with an inverse-S shape.  Thus we find an indication that EU 
theory is not consistent with our data.  ? = in models (2-1) and (4-1) turn out to be relatively large 
(greater than one), suggesting ￿￿￿￿   ￿ for a relatively wide range of small probabilities.  < > is 
higher in models with ￿￿￿￿￿ than with ￿￿￿￿￿.  Since γ controls both curvature and elevation of 
￿￿￿￿￿, the effect captured by the high value of estimated δ in ￿￿￿￿￿ (i.e. high weights given to 
the worse outcome) is captured by a higher value of < > in ￿￿￿￿￿.  It is also likely that the same 
effect captured by ? = in models (2-1) and (4-1) is captured by a higher ( = value in model (1-1).  
That is, in model (1-1), without δ separately regulating the elevation of the curve, the disutility of 
losses due to higher weights placed on worse outcome is captured by higher ( = and < > values. 
Inclusion of individual characteristics 
Table  3  summarizes  the  results  of  equation  (9),  where  the  parameters  of  the  probability 
weighting and utility functions are allowed to vary with respondents’ individual characteristics, 
and utility shifters, 7.  In this exercise we use hh_age (years) and education (years) as covariates 
for utility function parameters ) and (, and experience, education and publand as covariates for 
probability  weighting  function  parameters  ? =  and  < > .    We  include  in  utility  shifters,  7 , 
Tahoe*nature,  a  variable  to  indicate  respondent  preferences  for  landscape  qualities  that  are 
positively associated with wildfire risks (so that some wildfire preparedness actions could result 
in disutility to residents).  The data include respondents with homes in high desert sagebrush 
areas (sagebrush steppe) and others with homes in the forested mountains near Lake Tahoe.  
                                                           
4  Under expected utility this would have a risk-loving interpretation.  However, this expected utility interpretation 
of β may not hold in this case because the experimental design did not allow respondents to display risk-adverse 
preferences.  Under prospect theory, there is no need to impose that preferences over probabilities are symmetric. 16 
 
Because these landscapes are quite different, and people may be more likely to self-select to 
choose to live in the Lake Tahoe area due to landscape amenity values, we interact nature with a 
Lake  Tahoe  dummy.    We  also  include  primary  and  regulation  in 7 to  indicate  whether  the 
residence  is  the  respondent’s  primary  home  (versus  a  second  home  or  rental)  and  the 
respondent’s stated attitude toward the use of regulation to impose wildfire preparedness. 
Again, the model with the combination of ￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿￿ performs poorly.  In model (3-2) 
the  hypothesis  of  all  coefficients  simultaneously  being  zero  is  not  rejected.    As  would  be 
expected,  the  combination  of  the  less  restrictive  forms  for  probability  weighting  and  utility, 
￿￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿￿ in model (4-2) performs better than the other three models.  For the CRRA 
models (i.e. without )), hh_age and education explains ( = in a similar manner between the two 
models (1-2 and 2-2).  However, the more flexible Expo-power form with ) included to allow 
for  variation  in  the  absolute  value  of  disutility  of  losses  in  model  (4-2)  presents  with  very 
different coefficients for these same variables, with opposite signs on hh_age and education that 
influence ( =.  In this model, ) > is increasing with hh_age and decreasing with education.  In this 
case separating the effects of the convexity of the utility function from magnitude of disutility is 
important.  Model (4-2) implies that the level of disutility increases with education and decreases 
with mean household age. 
Turning to the probability weighting function parameters < > and ? =, we see little difference 
between models (2-2) and (4-2).  On the other hand, while in model (1-2) with the less flexible 
form, experience is not significant and the sign on the distance to public lands is negative, the 
opposite is true for these coefficients in model (4-2), where the inclusion of ? to allow the shape 
of the curve to vary separately from its height.  The distance from public lands negatively affects 
? =, the attractiveness of the gamble.  That is, the closer the residence is to public lands (which 17 
 
may  enhance  a  respondent’s  sense  of  risk),  the  more  attractive  the  gamble  appears.    Prior 
experience  with  wildfire  is  positively  associated  with  the  level  of ( = ,  implying  that  past 
experience is related to probability weights that are close to linear and expected utility. 
The utility shifters have two sets of effects: direct effect on the utility of each shifter, and 
indirect effects on the parameters on the probability weighting.  We first discuss the direct effects, 
again ignoring model (3-2).  The negative sign on Tahoe* nature is intuitive.  Residents who live 
in  the  forested  areas  near  Lake  Tahoe  and  indicate  that  they  value  the  natural  environment 
around their homes, receive less utility from fire preparedness investments.  For people who use 
the home as their primary residence, the investment is more utility enhancing.  And utility from 
wildfire preparedness investments are positively correlated with strength of agreement that such 
investments should be regulated. 
Inclusion  of  utility  shifters  changes  the  parameter  estimates  of  the  “original  prospective 
utility” (i.e. ￿ 4 instead of ￿ 8 @ A).  Ignoring model (3-2), we see that the mean predicted values of ), B ( = 
and < > are  comparable  to  those  from  the  previous  models  (Table  2),  while  the  level  of ? = is 
substantially different.  In the model with utility shifters, ? = has decreased substantially and is less 
than unity.  Puzzling at first sight, the results are nonetheless explicable.  We obtain ? = ￿ 1 when 
the utility shifter Z in models (2-2) and (4-2) contains only a constant (results not shown in table).  
This  finding  indicates  that  utility  shifters,  or  even  a  constant  term,  capture  some  important 
portion  of  changes  in  the  overall  prospective  utility 9￿ 8￿ ￿ ￿ 8￿; due  to  the  fire  preparedness 
investment.  The total effect of the Z terms in estimation turns out to be positive, capturing 
prospective-utility-increasing effects of fire-safe investment, net of the change in the original 
prospective utility ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿.  In the original specification (Table 2), the same utility-increasing 
effects (i.e. risk averse  attitude) are captured in the parameters of probability weighting and 18 
 
utility functions.  A smaller value of ( or larger value of ? produces such effects.  Given the 
relatively  stable  values  of ( =,  it  is  conceivable  that  the  effects  of  the  Z  terms  influence  the 
parameters of the probability weighting function more than those of utility function. 
The effect of small and large values of δ on prospective utility is also seen graphically.  δ>1 
given the estimated values of γ around 0.2-0.5 results in a wide range of overweighed probability 
￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿, while the range is much smaller for δ <1 (see Figure 3).  Recall that more than half 
the observations are consistent with risk-seeing attitude (“no” to the investment option) even 
when the expected losses are reduced by the investment.  Once the utility-increasing effects of 
investment are captured by Z terms, ? = needs to be smaller to accommodate risk seeking attitude 
for a range of (larger) probabilities. 
While it is now clear why the models with utility shifters result in smaller values of ? =, the 
implication of the differences in ? = values between models with and without utility shifters needs 
to be resolved.  Parameter δ determines the range of small probabilities that are overweighted 
and the range of large probabilities that are underweighted.  Therefore, the parameter value itself 
is  of  concern  to  stakeholders  and  policy-makers.    While  selection  of  appropriate  estimation 
model is an empirical question, we find that models without utility shifters can be restrictive in 
capturing  changes  in  utility  between  “lotteries”  for  some  applications.    While  many  data 
collection efforts through experiments control for the contexts in which the lotteries are offered, 
in real-world applications, the contexts can vary and can be important.  We believe that inclusion 
of utility shifters, as has been done in the valuation literature, is appropriate for our application, 
and the result from the models with utility shifters – small ? = or a wider range of probabilities that 
are underweighted – seems consistent with the anecdotal evidence that homeowners invest less 
than anticipated even when they face non-negligible chance of wildfire. 19 
 
Conclusions and Discussions 
In  this  paper,  using  survey  data  with  a  willingness-to-pay  elicitation  approach  that 
combines experimental methods developed by Harrison (2006) and CV methods, we empirically 
estimate risk preferences of private property owners who face wildfire threats in Nevada.  We 
find that the data exhibit inconsistency with predictions of the expected utility theory.  Instead, 
we find that the property owners tend to underweight large probabilities but overweight small 
probabilities of fires.  In a companion paper that analyzes factors affecting actual adoption of 
fire-safe actions, it is found that actual fire-safe action decisions are importantly associated with 
individual  wildfire  risk perception  (Kobayashi,  Zirogiannis,  Rollins,  and  Evans,  2010).    Our 
estimation results in this paper provide further explanation of how such risk perception may be 
formed.  We also find that risk preferences are associated with individual characteristics of the 
property owners.  Such demographic information is readily available to policy makers, and thus 
our  results  will  be  useful  in  designing  policies  to  address  potential  underinvestment  in  fire-
preparedness  by  private  property  owners  due  to  their  risk  preferences.    In  the  case  of  this 
application, if expected utility theory been assumed to hold, welfare estimates of polices that 
target enhancing private investment in wildfire preparedness would be biased.   
The  observed  nonlinear  preferences  in  probabilities  are  consistent  with  many  other 
experimental and field observations.  In the case of public policies that concern probabilistic 
outcomes, CV approaches that assume EU may lead to biased welfare estimates.  We argue that 
there is a role for work to incorporate non-EU theoretic approaches in CV, and this current study 
is a step in that direction.  A focus in much of the existing literature has been to control for or 
eliminate the effect of context on measurement of risk preferences, because it has been shown 
that  such  preferences  are  context-dependent.    Wakker  (1994)  demonstrates  theoretically  that 20 
 
while utility is independent of preferences over risk, risk preferences are not independent of 
utility, and several studies empirically confirm this.  However, for relevance to CV, context 
dependency implies that combining risk preference and utility elicitation methods in a policy-
relevant context is important.   
The context of our application is such that the CV ‘good’ is willingness-to-pay for dollar-
valued  losses.    This  provides  us  with  an  ideal  situation  to  apply  methods  developed  in  the 
experimental literature because the dollar valued outcomes allow for isolation of the effect of 
risk  parameters.    For  future  work  to  be  most  relevant  to  CV  methods,  where  estimation  of 
willingness-to-pay is generally for a change in the quality or quantity of a non-market good, this 
approach will require some other means to isolate the parameters for risk preferences from utility. 
Finally, these results reiterate the potential gains from incorporating non utility theory and field 
experiments into applied environmental economics. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in this Study
a 
Variable  Description  Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min  Max 
             
choices  1 if ‘yes’ to given fire-safe investment 
plan; 0 otherwise 
1149  0.459  0.499  0  1 
p  Probability of fire  1149  0.247  0.219  0.010  0.600 
d0  Losses due to fire when no action is 
taken 
1149  -124.935  61.437  -200  -50 
d1  Losses when fire-safe action is taken  1149  -28.460  35.038  -100  0 
c  Cost of fire-safe action  1149  -8.661  9.387  -40  -0.063 
EL0  Expected loss without action  1149  -31.569  36.104  -120  -0.500 
EL1  Expected loss with action  1149  -15.962  19.217  -90  -0.250 
             
hh_age  Average age of respondent’s household 
members in years 
366  47.636  17.599  9  75 
education  Years of formal education  370  15.424  2.605  9  19 
publand  Distance from public land (miles)  377  0.960  1.637  0  5 
experience  1 if experience with wildfire; 0 
otherwise 
383  0.637  0.481  0  1 
Tahoe  1 if community near Lake Tahoe; 0 
otherwise 
365  0.395  0.489  0  1 
nature
b  Love for nature and privacy as a reason 
for not taking fire-safe action (1 No!! - 
5 Yes!!) 
323  3.183  0.978  1  5 
primary  1 if the high-risk residence is the 
primary residence 
380  0.689  0.463  0  1 
regulation  Approve stricter building regulations 
about fire safety (1 No!! - 5 Yes!!) 
363  3.590  0.940  1  5 
a All monetary values are in thousand US dollars. 
b Variable created according to factor analysis. 
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results without Covariates 
 
(nobservations=1149, nrespondents=383) 
(1-1)  (2-1)  (3-1)  (4-1) 
Utility  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ 
Prob. weighting  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ 
 













δ     1.056
***    1.232
*** 
     
    
Log pseudo-likelihood  -851.820  -748.111  -785.051  -745.795 
Prob > χ
2(0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: 
Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results with Explanatory Variables 
 
(nobservations=876, nrespondents=292) 
  (1-2)  (2-2)  (3-2)  (4-2) 
Utility  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ 
Prob. weighting  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿ 
α         
hh_age      -0.00912  0.0130*** 
education      0.0765  -0.0726*** 
constant      -1.316  0.695*** 
β         
hh_age  -0.00328**  -0.00369***  -0.00189  0.00505** 
education  0.0203**  0.0146*  0.0136  -0.0347** 
constant  0.203  0.300**  0.0328  0.800*** 
γ         
publand  -0.0284  0.0584  -0.193  0.0541 
experience  0.025  0.250**  -1.471  0.274** 
education  -0.0149  -0.033  0.717  -0.0426 
constant  0.686***  0.591  -3.127  0.758 
δ         
publand    -0.0461**    -0.0745*** 
experience    0.0241    0.023 
education    -0.0211    -0.0534 
constant    0.826*    1.452** 
C         
Tahoe*nature  -0.0129  -0.0588  0.00157  -0.0681 
primary  -0.0101  0.0535  -0.0364  0.0617 
regulation  0.192***  0.179**  0.170**  0.178** 
constant  0.162  0.150  1.174*  0.164 
         
Mean predicted α      -0.570  0.195 
Mean predicted β  0.360  0.349  0.152  0.504 
Mean predicted γ  0.443  0.297  6.827  0.327 
Mean predicted δ    0.470    0.568 
         
Log pseudo-likelihood  -533.5  -521.4  -549.5  -519.9 
Prob > χ
2(2)  0.0046  0.0016  0.3053  0.0020 
Notes: 
Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. 28 
 
Figure 1. Probability Weighting Function (a) and (b) 
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Figure 3. Probability Weighting Function (b) 
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Appendix: Survey Questions 
 
 
Suppose that there is a ___A___% chance of a wildfire in the area near your home during 2006.   
  
Also suppose that if a fire should occur your loss would be $__B_ if you do nothing else to reduce  
the threat to your home.    
  
Finally, suppose that if you spend $__C__ over the next 4 months on fire safe actions, your loss  
from a wildfire would be reduced to $__D__.    
  
       _________________________________________________________________________ 
  
                          Please use the information above to answer the next three questions.                                                            
                __________________________________________________________________________ 
  
     1.  Would you spend $_C_ over the next 4 months to reduce your loss from a possible wildfire  
          from $__B___ to $___D___? 
       





      2.    Now imagine a policy that would provide a three-to-one match on what you spend on  
             fire safe actions.  For a project that costs $__C___, your share would only be $___1/4 C___.   
   The other half is covered by the one-to-one match.   
    
             In this case, would you spend the $__1/4C__ to reduce your loss from a possible wildfire  
             from $__B___ to $___D___?    
  




3.    Now suppose that in order to stretch funds over a larger number of people, the match is one-to-one.  .  For a project 
that costs $__C___, your share would be $___1/2C___.  Matching funds would cover the other half.   
 
   In this case, would you spend the $___1/2C______ to reduce your loss from a possible wildfire  
             from  $___B____ to $___D_____?   
   
        ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Yes!!!     ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Yes!         ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Yes        ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Maybe       ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿No          ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿No!         ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿No!!!  
  
 